










FISCAL POLICIES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 





CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1933 












An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




FISCAL POLICIES AND BUSINESS CYCLES 





This paper compares the cyclical properties of fiscal policies across the 12 original eurozone 
countries and the future members from Central and Eastern Europe. For the sample period 
1995-2005, the fiscal balance exhibits less inertia and is more counter-cyclical in Central and 
Eastern European countries than in members of the eurozone. The main differences arise from 
the revenue side. Differences in the formation of fiscal policy between current and future 
eurozone countries decrease over time. Autonomous fiscal policy has little or no effect on 
cyclical variability in either of the two groups of countries. Counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
appears to be effective in Central and Eastern European countries, but largely ineffective in 
eurozone countries. 
JEL Code: E62, E63, E32. 







Bank of Estonia 








30 January 2007 
The author would like to thank David Mayes, Egle Tafenau and numerous colleagues at the 
Estonian Central Bank for useful comments and suggestions. The author has also benefited 
from comments by the discussant, Evzen Kocenda, and other workshop participants at the 
CESifo workshop “Euro-Area Enlargement”, 24 November 2006. All remaining errors and 
omissions are the responsibility of the author. The views expressed are those of the author and 
do not represent the official views of the Bank of Estonia.   2 
1. Introduction 
 
The 12 countries that became members of the European Union on, respectively, 1 May 2004 
and 1 January 2007 have committed themselves to joining the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) in due course. This will bring countries that have recently emerged from central plan-
ning and widespread economic repression into the EMU. This paper seeks to advance our un-
derstanding of fiscal policies in these countries and shed light on possible differences between 




The conduct of fiscal policy has been one of the most contentious issues in the operation of 
the EMU. Fiscal policy issues are also likely to play a major role in future years as new EU 
members join the eurozone. The question is therefore which fiscal policy challenges transition 
countries are going to experience before and after entering the eurozone and, correspondingly, 
which challenges can the eurozone expect. While the formation and effectiveness of fiscal 
policies have been well researched for the 15 “old” EU countries, relatively few studies have 
considered these issues for the new EU members, and no studies have used econometric 
methods to compare fiscal policies across the existing and future members of the eurozone. 
 
This paper builds on a panel dataset with a large number of variables from 27 EU members 
across 11 years. The main line of inquiry is to examine possible differences in the functioning 
of fiscal policies across the existing eurozone members and the countries that will join the eu-
rozone in the coming years. Two key questions are addressed. First, are the cyclical proper-
ties of fiscal policy different across the existing and future eurozone members? Are policies 
counter-cyclical, a-cyclical or pro-cyclical, and how do they differ across these groups of 
countries? Second, what are the effects of fiscal policies on economic fluctuations in the euro-
zone and for the future members? Do fiscal policies reduce economic fluctuations, aggravate 
fluctuations or are they largely ineffective?  
 
The first question relates to the fulfilment of the deficit requirement of the Maastricht criteria 
stating that the deficit cannot exceed 3% of GDP except in extraordinary circumstances. The 
criterion is also present in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which applies to countries 
inside the European Monetary Union. If fiscal policies are strongly counter-cyclical, the risk 
of breaking the 3% limit may be large during downturns. In other words, strong counter-
cyclicality may pose a serious challenge when a country is seeking EMU membership, but 
possibly also after having achieved membership.  
 
The second question relates to the prevalence of cyclical output fluctuations for EMU mem-
bers. A country that has joined the eurozone cannot pursue monetary or exchange rate policies 
independently in case an asymmetric shock affects the economy adversely. In this situation, 
fiscal policy becomes the main policy tool for stabilising output fluctuations. As an introduc-
tion to the SGP, the European Commission (2006) states: “[I]t was also recognised that the 
loss of the exchange rate instrument in EMU would imply a greater role for automatic fiscal 
stabilisers at national level to help economies adjust to asymmetric shocks”. 
 
The scope of macroeconomic stabilisation is important for assessing what constitutes an op-
timal currency area (OCA) and whether the 12 original members of the EMU constitute such 
                                                
1  Slovenia  joined  the  EMU on 1 January 2007 and thus became the first country from Central and Eastern 
Europe to enter the eurozone. In this paper, Slovenia is included in the group of future eurozone members as data 
for the empirical analysis is only available until 2005.   3 
an area. The theory on optimal currency areas outlines conditions under which countries par-
ticipating in a currency union would not experience excessive output and employment insta-
bility when subject to asymmetric shocks. It is common to point to labour and capital mobil-
ity, price and wage flexibility and the mechanism for fiscal transfers across the member coun-
tries (Baldwin & Wyplosz 2004). It is important to emphasise that the economies of countries 
participating in a currency union will adapt to the changed macroeconomic conditions; this 
implies that the degree of fulfilment of the OCA criteria is endogenously determined (Frankel 
& Rose 1998).  
 
As stated, asymmetric shocks might be of less importance if the fiscal policy is counter-
cyclical and effective in reducing output and employment fluctuations (Ardy et al. 2006, ch. 
2).
2 A fiscal policy reducing real economic variability needs not involve inter-constituency 
transfers,  but  rather  the  intertemporal  reallocation  of  government  spending  and  taxation 
within each country.  
 
There is extensive literature discussing whether the expanded European Union constitutes an 
optimal currency area and, in particular, whether the business cycles across the member coun-
tries are converging; see, for example, Korhonen (2003) and Frenkel & Nickel (2005). The 
importance of fiscal policies in the EMU and the effect of the SGP on fiscal policy and eco-
nomic fluctuations have been widely discussed; see, for example, Wyplosz (2002), Ballabriga 
& Martinez-Mongay (2003), Fatas & Mihov (2003b), Annett & Jaeger (2004), Ardy et al. 
(2006) and Buti & Sapir (2006).  
 
Relatively little has been written on fiscal policy challenges stemming from the expansion of 
the eurozone to include the former transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
3 This 
applies in particular to the formation of fiscal policy and its effects across an expanded euro-
zone. Nuti (2006) discusses fiscal policy in the new EU member states and argues that the 
Maastricht criteria and the SGP represent undue constraints on these rapidly developing coun-
tries. Berger et al. (2007) argue that the differences in the overall fiscal stance of the Central 
European accession countries can be explained by the bargaining position of the countries vis-
à-vis the other EU countries with respect to the fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria. Afonso et 
al. (2005) analyse cases of fiscal consolidation in the CEE countries and seek to determine 
factors leading to a permanent improvement of the fiscal balance. Kattai & Lewis (2005) es-
timate fiscal policy reactions for individual countries in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
The issues analysed in this paper are important for new EU countries seeking to join the EMU 
in the future. The issues are, however, also important in their own right, i.e. even if the coun-
tries do not become eurozone members in the immediate future. Several issues are notewor-
thy. 
 
First, the improvement of the management of fiscal policy and its integration with other poli-
cies require that fiscal policy formation be analysed and evaluated. It is of particular interest 
to understand the economic and political factors affecting, respectively, the cyclical properties 
of fiscal policy and the prevalence of autonomous or non-systematic discretionary fiscal pol-
                                                
2 Ardy et al. (2006, ch. 2) list three different areas from which tensions can arise if a common macroeconomic 
policy is sought, i.e. that policymakers have different preferences, that countries are hit by different shocks and 
that the effect of shocks and policy instruments vary across countries. 
3 Budina & van Wijnbergen (1997) present a study of fiscal policy in Central and Eastern Europe during the 
early transition phase.    4 
icy.
4 Recent empirical studies include Roubini & Sachs (1989), Alesina & Perotti (1995, 
1997) and Fatas  & Mihov (2003a); none of these consider the post-communist transition 
economies in any detail.  
 
Second, the effectiveness of fiscal policy in stabilising cyclical fluctuations in output and em-
ployment is important in so far as fluctuations affect social welfare. Theory provides a range 
of hypotheses to be tested, e.g. the Keynesian fiscal multiplier, the Ricardian equivalence hy-
pothesis and tax smoothing across the cycle (Romer 2005, chs. 5, 7, 11). Empirically, the joint 
endogeneity of fiscal policy and output performance necessitates the use of challenging meth-
ods to ensure identification, e.g. natural experiments, VAR-models or various forms of in-
strumental variables estimation.
5 The studies reach rather conflicting results with respect to 
the effect of fiscal policy, presumably because they use different definitions for fiscal policy 
variable(s) and consider different countries and time horizons.  
 
Third, there is an increasing body of evidence suggesting that macroeconomic stability can 
contribute to higher long-term growth; see e.g. Fischer (1993) and Fatas & Mihov (2005). 
Aghion & Howitt (2006) argue that short-term output volatility leads to a lower trend growth 
rate in countries with less developed financial markets: in a neo-Schumpeterian growth set-
ting, economic fluctuations lead to too many firm exits if capital and insurance markets are 
imperfect.  The  upshot  is  that  policies  reducing  economic  fluctuations  may  also  enhance 
growth. This claim is supported by empirical evidence assessing growth in 17 OECD coun-
tries over the period 1965-2001.  
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
fiscal policies in Western and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s. Section 3 assesses factors 
determining the fiscal policy reactions in, respectively, the current and future eurozone mem-
bers. Section 4 considers the effect of fiscal policy measures on output fluctuations. Finally, 
Section 5 summarises and discusses some policy implications. 
 
 
2. Fiscal policies in current and future eurozone countries 
 
The two regions in Europe faced different fiscal policy challenges during the eventful years 
following the reunification of Germany, the political integration of Western Europe and the 
emergence of Eastern European countries as market-based democracies. This section reviews 
briefly the fiscal policy developments in Europe since 1990. 
 
Our sample comprises a total of 27 European countries: the 12 eurozone countries, the three 
old EU countries outside the eurozone (Denmark, Sweden and the UK), the 10 new EU mem-
ber countries from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Malta and Cyprus.
6 The applicant 
countries Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey are not included in the sample. 
 
The statistical analysis relies mainly on data from Eurostat (see Appendix A for detailed vari-
able descriptions and sources). There are some missing observations especially for the transi-
                                                
4 Changes in autonomous (or non-systematic discretionary) fiscal policy are changes that cannot be explained by 
cyclical developments in the economy or other easily observable factors (Gali & Perotti 2003).  
5 Important studies considering the effect of automatic stabilisers, counter-cyclical fiscal policies and/or other 
forms of fiscal policies include Aschauer (1985) and more recently Cohen & Follette (2000), Fatas & Mihov 
(2001), Blanchard & Perotti (2002), Perotti (2005), Caldara & Kamps (2006) and Bayomi & Sgheri (2006). 
6 Some data series for Malta and Cyprus are quite volatile and often available for short time periods only.   5 
tion countries in the early years of the sample and for Malta and Cyprus. Attempts to extend 
the data series backwards have been unsuccessful. We tried to include data on government 
finances from the Government Financial Statistics of the IMF and from the Transition Reports 
of the EBRD, but both the level and the dynamics of the series generally differ markedly from 
the Eurostat data. Overall, the data series from Eurostat is reckoned to be consistent across 
countries and of acceptable quality.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992, constitutes the legal foundation for deeper 
cooperation within the (relabelled) European Union. A cornerstone was the establishment of 
the European Monetary Union with a shared currency and a common monetary policy (Wy-
plosz 2006, Buti & Sapir 2006). The Maastricht Treaty spelled out a set of convergence crite-
ria, which all prospective member countries – in principle – had to fulfil before being admit-
ted.
7 The Maastricht criteria involved requirements on inflation, long-term interest rates and 
exchange rate stability. In addition, two of the criteria constitute restrictions on government 
finances, i.e. that the general government deficit cannot exceed 3% of GDP, save in excep-
tional circumstances, and that the government gross debt stays within 60% of GDP or has 
been approaching the 60% ceiling at a satisfactory pace.  
 
The Stability and Growth Pact requires that the countries participating in the EMU maintain 
fiscal coefficients within the limits of the Maastricht Treaty. The SGP was decided in Decem-
ber 1996 and stipulated that a country breaching the 3% deficit ceiling would be subject to an 
excessive deficit procedure unless one or more “relevant factors” explained the deficit. A re-
vised SGP from March 2005 makes the rules concerning the use of the excessive deficit pro-
cedure more flexible.  
 
The 1990s became a period where governments in most EU countries strived to satisfy par-
ticularly the fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. In May 1998, the heads of the EU coun-
tries came to the decision that 11 countries satisfied the criteria, and the euro was launched on 
1 January 1999 followed by euro-denominated banknotes and coins on 1 January 2002. In 
June 2000, the accession of Greece to the EMU was approved as from 1 January 2001. The 
downturn in the European economies after the bursting of the tech bubble in 2000-01 strained 
government finances, especially in the large, core EMU countries.  
 
The countries in Central and Eastern Europe faced numerous challenges in the 1990s. Most of 
them gained or regained independence and had to build up new national government finance 
systems.  The  transition to a market economy and the deep recessions in the early 1990s 
strained budget balances (Budina & van Wijnbergen 1997). A number of CEE countries ex-
perienced financial crises. For many CEE countries the Russian crisis in the fall of 1998 led to 
a significant trade contraction, financial instability and growth setbacks.  
 
Table 1 shows the annual GDP growth (GY) for three groups of countries. The Eurozone 12 
group comprises the 11 countries that became EMU members in 1999 and Greece, which en-
tered in 2001. The group Denmark, Sweden & UK consists of the three old EU members that 
did not join the EMU. The CEE10 group is made up of the 10 countries from Central and 
Eastern Europe that joined the EU in May 2004 and January 2007. The different growth ex-
periences across the old and new EU members become particularly apparent after 1999, when 
growth stagnated in the groups of Western European countries (Eurozone 12 and Denmark, 
Sweden & UK, while it accelerated in the group of CEE10 countries.  
                                                
7 It is clear, however, that one-off measures, short-term asset transfers and “creative bookkeeping” enabled a 
number of especially Southern European countries to meet the Maastricht criteria (Nuti 2006).   6 
Table 1. Annual GDP growth as a percent (GY), unweighted averages for country groups, 1995-2005 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Eurozone 12  5.5  2.7  4.2  4.1  4.4  4.8  2.4  1.9  1.6  2.7  2.1 
Denmark, Sweden & UK  3.3  2.3  2.9  3.0  3.4  3.9  1.3  1.5  1.6  2.9  2.5 
CEE10
a)  3.0  2.8  4.6  4.1  2.1  4.6  4.5  4.5  5.2  6.2  6.3 
a) No data available for the Czech Republic and Bulgaria for 1995 and for Romania for 1995-98. 
Source: Eurostat (2006), own calculations. 
Table 2 shows the general budget balance as a percent of gross domestic product (BAL) for 
the three groups of countries. The average budget balance for the period 1995-2005 (or avail-
able sample years) is -2.2% of GDP for the eurozone countries, 0% for Denmark, Sweden & 
UK and -2.8% for the 10 new EU members from Central and Eastern Europe. There are con-
siderable differences across the countries within each group, cf. the country-specific data re-
ported in Appendix B. 
Table 2. General government balance as a percentage of GDP (BAL), unweighted averages for coun-
try groups, 1995-2005 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005 
Eurozone 12
a)  -4.4  -3.5  -1.7  -1.0  -0.4  0.8  -0.5  -1.2  -1.8  -1.8  -1.6 
Denmark, Sweden & UK  -5.3  -3.0  -1.1  0.7  2.0  3.5  1.9  -0.2  -0.7  0.4  1.4 
CEE10
b)  ..  ..  -2.9  -2.9  -3.5  -3.3  -3.0  -3.4  -2.6  -1.9  -1.8 
a) No data available for Spain for 1995-96. 
b) No data available for Latvia and Hungary for 1997-98 and for Bulgaria and Romania for 2005. 
Source: Eurostat (2006), own calculations. 
For the eurozone countries, the years before the turn of the century comprised a period of 
rapid fiscal consolidation. It is noteworthy, however, that the group of EU countries not par-
ticipating in the EMU underwent a similar consolidation during the same period.
8 The fiscal 
position has deteriorated in both EMU and non-EMU countries since the turn of the century, 
and 2000 remains the only year in the sample in which the EMU countries on average attained 
a positive budget balance.  
 
Fiscal policies in the Central and Eastern European countries have generally led to larger 
deficits than experienced in the eurozone countries and the group comprising Denmark, Swe-
den and the UK. The Visegrad countries have pursued policies that in some years have led to 
substantial headline deficits. Fiscal policies in the Baltic States and Bulgaria have been re-
strained by the fixed exchange rate policies pursued in these countries (Mueller et al. 2002, 
Grigonyte 2003).  
 
Table 3 shows that the general government debt stock as a percentage of GDP (DEBT) fell in 
the eurozone countries until 2002, but has remained stable since . The average debt burden in 
the new EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe is less than half the level in the old 
EU countries. In spite of substantial deficits, the government debt burden in the region has 
remained stable partly as a result of relatively rapid GDP growth.  
                                                
8 This sheds some doubt on the widely asserted claim that although the Maastricht criteria may be somewhat 
arbitrary,  the  criteria  contributed  to  an  increased  focus  on  prudence  and  economic stability in  fiscal  policy-
making (Buti & Sapir 2006, Afxentiou 2000). Still, individual countries, such as Italy and Greece, did exhibit a 
substantial fiscal consolidation during the 1990s.    7 
Table 3. Government consolidated gross debt as a percentage of GDP (DEBT), unweighted averages 
for country groups, 1995-2005 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
a) 
Eurozone 12  74.8  74.4  71.6  68.5  67.0  64.8  63.7  61.9  61.7  61.5  61.6 
Denmark, Sweden & UK  73.1  72.6  69.7  66.6  64.6  61.6  60.4  58.6  58.4  58.2  57.9 
CEE10
b)  ..  ..  29.2  25.4  28.6  28.6  29.4  29.7  30.5  30.0  28.8 
a) Estimates by Eurostat.  
b) No data available for Latvia and Slovenia for 1995-98 and for Bulgaria and Romania for 2005. 
Source: Eurostat (2006), own calculations. 
One main conclusion follows from the descriptive review in this section, namely that the Eu-
rozone 12 countries and the new EU members – when taken as groups – have experienced 
very different fiscal policy trends and business cycles since 1995. It is also clear that there is 
substantial variation across the countries in the two groups. These considerations lead to the 
question whether the different developments are also reflected in the way fiscal policy is 
formed and functions in the two groups.  
 
 
3. The cyclical reaction of fiscal policy 
 
This section analyses how different factors have affected fiscal policy variables in the original 
12 eurozone countries and the 10 new EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe. We es-
timate fiscal policy reaction functions, which explain the fiscal policy stance by policy inertia, 
economic fluctuations and different variables reflecting debt-servicing requirements. A num-
ber of recent studies estimate such fiscal policy rules to ascertain, e.g. the cyclicality of fiscal 
policies  (Fatas  &  Mihov  2001,  Gali  &  Perotti  2003  and  Ballabriga  &  Martinez-Mongay 
2003). 
 
The main objective is to assess whether the reaction functions of the CEE countries differ 
from those of the eurozone countries. The short time dimension of the sample necessitates the 
use of panel data estimation. Estimations of reaction functions for each country would lead to 
unreliable results. We estimate separate coefficients for, respectively, the eurozone countries 
and the CEE countries and then compare the results across the two groups of countries. An 
essentially similar approach is used in Gali & Perotti (2003) and Wyplosz (2006) to assess 
changes over time.  
 
The choice of the two groups is based on a number of factors. First, as described in Section 2, 
the countries within each of the two groups have faced a number of similar challenges (EMU 
qualification and SGP vs. post-transition adjustment). Second, the economic structure varies 
markedly across the two groups (high-income service economies vs. lower-income manufac-
turing economies). Third, the operation of the EMU implies that the common monetary policy 
has throughout most of the sample period been determined in co-operation between the 12 
original eurozone countries, while the stabilisation policies in the CEE countries have not 
been constrained by similar institutional arrangements. Ultimately, the appropriateness of the 
choice of groups rests on empirical testing – a point that will be returned to below.  
 
   8 
3.1 Inertia and cyclicality 
 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating reaction functions for the general government deficit 
as a percentage of GDP  under different assumptions and using different estimation tech-
niques. 
 
Column (4.1) shows the results when BAL, the general government balance as a percentage 
of GDP, is regressed on the one year lagged government balance (BAL(-1)), the contempora-
neous percentage change in output (GY), and the one year lagged debt stock as a percentage 
of GDP (DEBT(-1)) as well as country- and time-specific dummies. The separate effects of 
the explanatory variables for the two groups of countries are traced by interacting the explana-
tory variables with country group dummies. In specific, each of the explanatory variables is 
multiplied by the dummy variables W and E. The dummy W is equal to 1 for the Eurozone 12 
countries and otherwise 0; the dummy E is equal to 1 for the 10 Central and Eastern European 
countries and otherwise 0.
9 
 
The estimations include GY as a proxy for the cyclical stance. Clearly, the countries in the 
sample have different “natural rates” or trend growth rates, and it might thus have been useful 
to include the deviation from trend growth instead of the actual growth rate in the regressions. 
Different methods for estimating the trend growth rate give differing and often inaccurate re-
sults and are only known precisely with a very long lag (Hallett et al. 2007). Thus, with only 
11 years of annual data, it is reasonable to use the average growth rate during the period to 
approximate the trend growth rate. This assumption implies that changes in the output growth 
rate should be interpreted as changes in the output gap.
10 The assumption of a constant trend 
growth rate during the 11 years of the sample necessitates the use of country fixed effects (or 
equivalent) in all estimations. 
 
OLS estimation of dynamic panels with a lagged endogenous variable as an explanatory vari-
able generally leads to inconsistent coefficient estimates, even when cross-section fixed ef-
fects are used (Green 2000, ch. 14; Arellano 2003, chs. 7-8). Instead, we employ the Differ-
ence  GMM  Arellano-Bond  one-step  estimator  (GMM-AB).  The  regression  is  time-
differenced in order to remove cross-section specific effects and the differenced regression is 
then estimated using GMM with correctly lagged levels of the endogenous variable and non-
exogenous explanatory variables as instruments (together with other suitable instruments). 
The Arellano-Bond estimator is consistent (although biased in small samples); its efficiency 
depends on the characteristics of the sample (Judson & Owen 1999). 
 
The specific choice of instruments for the differenced equation requires careful consideration 
(Murray 2006). The lagged budget balance is instrumented using the two periods lagged level. 
The explanatory variable GY (contemporaneous output growth) may be affected by fiscal pol-
icy, which would lead GY to be correlated with the residual. Additionally, the GDP level is 
used to scale both the fiscal balance and the change in GDP. GY is therefore instrumented us-
ing its two periods lagged level as an instrument. The differencing of the debt variable and the 
scaling with the GDP imply that the pre-determined debt stock should also be instrumented; 
                                                





j · time dummy + error term, where Greek letter 
coefficients that are to be estimated.  
10 Some experiments using output gaps published by the IMF (World Economic Outlook Database) for some 
eurozone countries yielded mixed results. For some countries the results were essentially unchanged if GY were 
replaced by the change in the output gap, while for others (especially Germany) the difference was noticeable.    9 
its two period lagged level is chosen as an instrument. To increase efficiency, the number of 
level instruments can be increased, as additional predetermined values are available for the 
later years of the estimation sample. We have, however, chosen to abstain from using such 
dynamic instrumentation. First, the information content of level variables that are lagged more 
than two periods is likely to be limited. Second, the simple lag structure of the instruments 
makes it easier to retain the same instruments across different sub-divisions of the sample 
(country groups,  time periods). “Outside instruments”  are  included in the form of output 
growth in the USA, output growth in Russia, real oil price growth, and the real Fed funds in-
terest rate. These variables are deemed unaffected by developments in individual countries in 
the sample. The instruments are included separately for the group of Western European coun-
tries (W) and the group of Central and Eastern European countries (E). 
Table 4. Budget balance reaction functions 
  (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5) 
  BAL  BAL  BAL  BAL  BAL 
0.606***  0.725***  0.621***  0.586***  0.596***  BAL(-1)·W 
(0.141)  (0.052)  (0.080)  (0.136)  (0.145) 
0.099  0.084*  0.177**  0.099  0.244*  BAL(-1)·E 
(0.131)  (0.092)  (0.072)  (0.116)  (0.137) 
0.218**  0.189*  0.193***  0.268**  ..  GY·W 
(0.093)  (0.104)  (0.059)  (0.123)   
0.622***  0.593***  0.457***  0.496***  .. 
GY·E 
(0.146)  (0.135)  (0.103)  (0.149)   
..  ..  ..  ..  0.231**  GYP·W 
        (0.090) 
..  ..  ..  ..  0.363*** 
GYP·E 
        (0.059) 
-0.013  0.0090  -0.011  0.027  0.056  DEBT(-1)·W 
(0.022)  (0.028)  (0.0089)  (0.032)  (0.024) 
0.014  0.034  -0.0073  0.025  0.110** 
DEBT(-1)·E 
(0.030)  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.031)  (0.052) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Method  GMM-AB
a)  GMM-AB
a)  OLS/FE  GMM-AB
a)  GMM-AB
b) 
Time sample  95-05  95-05  95-05  95-05  95-05 
No. of countries  22  22  22  27  22 
No. of obs.  194  194  205  239  188 
Notes: White’s period robust standard errors are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimates. A post-positioned ***, ** or * 
indicates that the null hypothesis of the coefficient being 0 is rejected at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. 
a) The level instruments are BAL(-2), GY(-2) and DEBT(-2). The time-differenced instruments are output growth in the USA, output 
growth in Russia, real oil price growth, and the real Fed funds interest rate. The instruments are included separately for the W and E 
groups. If included in the regression, the year dummies are also used as level instruments.  
b) The instruments are as in a) except that GY(-2) is replaced by GYP(-2). 
The baseline estimation in (4.1) suggests that the eurozone countries and the future member 
countries exhibit very different fiscal policy reaction functions: a Wald test at the 5%-level 
rejects the joint null hypothesis that the coefficients to BAL(-1)·W and BAL(-1)·E, to GY·W 
and  GY·E  and  to  DEBT(-1)·W  and  DEBT(-1)·E  are  pair-wise  equal. In  other  words,  the 
coefficients to the explanatory variables of the eurozone countries differ significantly from the 
coefficients of the CEE countries.  
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The budget balance in the old eurozone countries exhibits substantial inertia, while this is 
much less prevalent in the future eurozone members from Central and Eastern Europe. A 
Wald test at the 5%-level rejects the null hypothesis that the coefficients to BAL(-1)·W and 
BAL(-1)·E are identical.  
 
The sensitivity of the budget balance to output shocks also differs markedly across the two 
groups of European countries. The coefficients to GY·W and GY·E are both positive and sig-
nificant at the 5%-level, but the former coefficient is much smaller than the latter. In the sam-
ple period, fiscal policies in the CEE countries have on average been more counter-cyclical 
(or reactive) than in the eurozone countries. In the CEE countries, a 1%-point fall in output 
growth has on average been associated with a 0.5%-point deterioration of the budget balance 
(expressed as a percentage of GDP). The results for the eurozone countries are broadly in line 
with earlier studies (Ballabriga & Martinez-Mongay 2003, Wyplosz 2006). This suggests that 
the results for the CEE are reliable although no directly comparable studies exist for these 
countries.  
 
The coefficients for the lagged debt stock are not significantly different from zero for any of 
the two country groups. A higher debt stock, which leads to higher interest payments, affects 
the overall balance in two ways: the extra interest payments lead directly to a deterioration of 
the overall balance, but this might bring about a compensatory change in the primary balance. 
These issues are addressed in more detail below. 
 
The results presented in (4.1) are robust to changes in the specification and in estimation 
methods. Column (4.2) shows that the results are largely unchanged when the year dummies 
are removed. In (4.3), the Arellano-Bond GMM estimation method is replaced by ordinary 
OLS  with  country  and  year  fixed  effects  (OLS/FE).
11  The  estimation  method  apparently 
makes little qualitative difference in this case. We also experimented with different instru-
mentation configurations and found that the choice of instruments affects the results to only a 
small extent. Column (4.4) shows the results when the three old EU members, Denmark, 
Sweden, the UK, as well as Malta and Cyprus are added to the W group of countries. The 
changes are small.  
 
The estimations in (4.1), (4.2) and (4.4) use instrumental variables to eliminate or reduce a 
possible simultaneity bias stemming from “reverse causality”, i.e. from fiscal policies affect-
ing the output growth rate. Column (4.5) shows the results when the overall output growth 
rate GY is replaced by the growth rate of private sector output (GYP). Private sector output is 
not directly affected by government spending and taxation, but only indirectly via the derived 
effects on private sector activity. Clearly, this does not eliminate possible endogeneity and 
GYP is therefore instrumented as before. The introduction of GYP into the fiscal balance re-
action  function  results in very little change for eurozone countries, but the coefficient to 
GYP·E is only 2/3 of the size of the estimate to GY·E in (4.1). The counter-cyclicality of fis-
cal policies for the CEE countries appears to be less pronounced when private sector growth 
is used instead of total output growth.
12 This may partly reflect the fact that GYP exhibits 
more variability than GY. The implausibly large coefficient to DEBT(-1) for the CEE coun-
                                                
11 OLS fixed effects estimation is chosen, as GY is the fiscal stance measure and trend growth varies across 
countries. It also implies that the results are comparable to those of the Arellano-Bond GMM estimations in 
(4.1)-(4.2). Furthermore, a Hausman test rejects the null hypotheses that the individual effects are uncorrelated 
with the other explanatory variables in the model.  
12 This result may be an indirect indication that counter-cyclical policies are most effective in the CEE countries. 
This result is indeed confirmed in Section 4.   11 
tries is related to the lower estimate for GYP for this group of countries; the two explanatory 
variables are correlated with a correlation coefficient equal to 0.52.  
 
We also examined the consequences of using a measure for the level of the output gap (in-
stead of the change as proxied by GY). Retaining the assumption of constant trend growth 
equal to average growth, the output gap level was calculated as accumulated changes in out-
put gaps during the period 1995-2005. (This measure is clearly subject to an “endpoint prob-
lem”.) The qualitative results were as before (not shown), although the difference between the 
coefficients to the cyclical measure across the eurozone and the CEE countries were smaller 
than found in (4.1).  
 
The choice of country groups was discussed above. The estimation of reaction curves for each 
country gives relatively few significant coefficients and any inference is generally unreliable. 
Instead, each of the two country groups was divided into two subgroups. The eurozone coun-
tries were divided into southern eurozone countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece) and 
the remainder. The CEE countries were divided into the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania) and the remainder. Regression (4.1) was then repeated with separate coefficients 
for BAL(-1), GY and DEBT(-1) for each of the four country groups. The results (not shown) 
indicate that the division into two main groups, the eurozone countries and the CEE countries, 
is indeed sensible. By means of example, the estimated coefficient for BAL(-1) is 0.74 for the 
northern, and 0.57 for the southern eurozone countries, while it is 0.22 for the Baltic States 
and 0.12 for the remaining CEE countries.
13 A Chow test indicates that restricting the coeffi-
cients so they are identical across the two subgroups cannot be rejected at the 1% level. 
 
 
3.2 Debt, interest payments  
 
The estimations in Table 4 generally suggest that the debt stock has little or no effect on the 
overall budget balance. A possible explanation is that while a higher debt stock leads to 
higher interest payments that directly strain the budget, it also provides incentives to tighten 
fiscal policy. These two effects may outweigh each other, a view which is supported by the 
estimations presented in this subsection.  
 
In Table 5, column (5.1) is repeated from (4.1) in Table 4 in order to ease comparisons with 
the following results. Column (5.2) shows the result when interest payments are added to re-
gression (4.1), i.e. the overall budget balance is regressed on its lagged value, output growth, 
the lagged debt stock and the interest payments. Neither the lagged debt stock nor interest 
payments attain significant coefficients.  
 
To assess the relative importance of direct and indirect effects on the fiscal balance from debt 
and interest payments, we estimated policy reaction functions explaining the primary budget 
balance as a percentage of GDP (PrBAL). Column (5.3) shows the results for when the pri-
mary balance is regressed on the lagged primary balance, economic growth and lagged debt 
stock. The results with respect to inertia and cyclicality are qualitatively unchanged. The coef-
ficient for the debt stock is insignificant for both the eurozone and the CEE countries.
14  
                                                
13 The only exception is an implausibly large coefficient for DEBT(-1) for the Baltic States. The small size of the 
subgroup and the very low debt levels make us discount this result as a statistical aberration.  
14 Although the estimated coefficients are insignificant, the point estimates of around 4% appear reasonable. Bal-
labriga & Martinez-Mongay (2003) and Wyplosz (2006), who use longer samples extending back to the 1980s, 
find that the debt stock has a positive impact on the primary balance.   12 
Table 5. Budget balance reaction functions – debt and interest payments 
  (5.1)  (5.2)  (5.3)  (5.4) 
  BAL  BAL  PrBAL  PrBAL 
0.606***  0.588***  ..  ..  BAL(-1)·W 
(0.141)  (0.156)     
0.099  0.023  ..  ..  BAL(-1)·E 
(0.131)  (0.101)     
..  ..  0.503***  0.547*** 
PrBAL(-1)·W 
    (0.146)  (0.127) 
..  ..  0.129  0.120 
PrBAL(-1)·E 
    (0.122)  (0.121) 
0.218**  0.156*  0.085  0.125  GY·W 
(0.093)  (0.086)  (0.105)  (0.076) 
0.622***  0.532***  0.655***  0.525*** 
GY·E 
(0.146)  (0.142)  (0.120)  (0.106) 
-0.013  -0.012  0.041  -0.0065  DEBT(-1)·W 
(0.022)  (0.020)  (0.040)  (0.017) 
0.014  0.058  0.041  0.053 
DEBT(-1)·E 
(0.030)  (0.051)  (0.047)  (0.038) 
..  -0.028  ..  0.393** 
INTR·W 
  (0.142)    (0.197) 
..  -0.213  ..  0.287 
INTR·E 
  (0.371)    (0.404) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 






Time sample  95-05  95-05  95-05  95-05 
No. of countries  22  22  22  22 
No. of obs.  194  189  186  186 
Notes: White’s period robust standard errors are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimates. A post-positioned ***, ** or * 
indicates that the null hypothesis of the coefficient being 0 is rejected at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. 
a) The level instruments are BAL(-2), GY(-2) and DEBT(-2). The time-differenced instruments are output growth in the USA, output 
growth in Russia, real oil price growth, and the real Fed funds interest rate. The instruments are included separately for the W and E 
groups. Year dummies are also used as level instruments. 
b) As in a) but INTR(-2) is added as level instrument. 
c) As in a) but BAL(-2) is replaced by PrBAL(-2). 
d) As in b) but BAL(-2) is replaced by PrBAL(-2). 
Column (5.4) shows the results for when the actual interest payment as a percentage of GDP 
(INTR) is added as a regressor in the primary balance reaction function. The debt stock is still 
without importance. The coefficient for the interest payments is significant at the 5% level for 
the eurozone countries, while it remains insignificant for the CEE countries. The coefficient 
estimate for INTR is around 0.4, implying that if interest payments increase by 1%-point of 
GDP, then the primary balance is strengthened by 0.4%-points of GDP. In other words, higher 
interest payments are only partly translated into an improved primary balance in eurozone 
countries. The coefficient for INTR is insignificant for the CEE countries, possibly reflecting 
that the debt stock and hence interest payments are relatively small there. 
 
The estimations presented in Table 5 show that the primary balance does not react to debt ac-
cumulation, but to the obligations of servicing the debt and then only significantly so for the 
eurozone countries. The headline budget balance appears to be unaffected by debt accumula-
tion and interest payments. This lack of feedback suggests that there are no direct mechanisms 
ensuring convergence towards low levels of government debt.   13 
3.3 Sample split and structural change 
 
The time sample used hitherto is 11 years (and shorter in some cases where the data is lack-
ing). The relatively short sample period has the advantage of making major fiscal policy re-
gime changes less likely within the sample. Still, during the period from 1995 to 2005 a num-
ber of events took place making it relevant to check for possible structural breaks along the 
time dimension. For the eurozone countries, the introduction of the euro may have affected 
domestic fiscal policies. For the CEE countries, the Russian crisis in the fall of 1998 was an 
important event that upset their economies in numerous ways. 
 
To assess whether the formation of fiscal policy changed during the period 1995-2005, we 
have split the sample into two sub-periods, i.e. 1995-2000 and 2001-2005. The small sample 
sizes suggest that the results should be interpreted with caution. For each sub-period the fiscal 
balance reaction function is estimated both with and without time dummies; the latter option 
preserves degrees of freedom. The results are shown in Table 6. Columns (6.1) and (6.2) re-
peat (4.1) and (4.2) from Table 4, i.e. the regressions for the full sample with and without time 
dummies. 
Table 6. Budget balance reaction functions – sample split and structural change 
  (6.1)  (6.2)  (6.3)  (6.4)  (6.5)  (6.6) 
  BAL  BAL  BAL  BAL  BAL  BAL 
0.606***  0.725***  0.539***  0.842***  0.705***  0.356 
BAL(-1)·W 
(0.141)  (0.052)  (0.117)  (0.089)  (0.211)  (0.248) 
0.099  0.084*  0.071  0.020  -0.012  -0.014 
BAL(-1)·E 
(0.131)  (0.092)  (0.305)  (0.257)  (0.159)  (0.172) 
0.218**  0.189*  0.025  -0.113*  0.771  0.511***  GY·W 
(0.093)  (0.104)  (0.068)  (0.069)  (0.276)  (0.173) 
0.622***  0.593***  0.204  0.224  0.751  0.946** 
GY·E 
(0.146)  (0.135)  (0.265)  (0.211)  (0.334)  (0.351) 
-0.013  0.0090  -0.031  -0.064  -0.048  0.081 
DEBT(-1)·W 
(0.022)  (0.028)  (0.032)  (0.041)  (0.068)  (0.069) 
0.014  0.034  0.044  0.036  0.032  0.041 
DEBT(-1)·E 
(0.030)  (0.027)  (0.067)  (0.051)  (0.074)  (0.076) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 








Time sample  95-05  95-05  95-00  95-00  01-05  00-05 
No. of countries  22  22  22  22  22  22 
No. of obs.  194  194  86  86  108  108 
Notes: White’s period robust standard errors are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimates. A post-positioned ***, ** or * 
indicates that the null hypothesis of the coefficient being 0 is rejected at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. 
a) The level instruments are BAL(-2), GY(-2) and DEBT(-2). The time-differenced instruments are output growth in the USA, output 
growth in Russia, real oil price growth, and the real Fed funds interest rate. The instruments are included separately for the W and E 
groups. If included in the regression, the year dummies are also used as level instruments. 
When comparing (6.3)-(6.6) with (6.1)-(6.2), it follows that it is difficult to obtain satisfactory 
estimation results for fiscal balance reactions when the two sub-samples are estimated sepa-
rately. The number of available observations is very small and this precludes formal empirical 
testing. It is apparent, however, that the coefficient for BAL(-1) remains larger for the euro-
zone 12 countries than for the CEE 10 countries in both sub-samples. This suggests that the   14 
policy inertia for the entire sample from 1995 to 2005 remains more pronounced in the group 
of  eurozone  countries  than  in  the  group  of  new  EU  members  from  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe.  
 
The coefficients for the economic cycle in the two groups of countries are generally impre-
cisely estimated. Still, while the coefficient for GY·W is insignificant in the first sub-period, it 
is sizeable and significant in the second sub-period, when the period dummies are suppressed. 
This would suggest that while in the second half of the 1990s fiscal policy was a-cyclical in 
the eurozone countries, it became counter-cyclical in the years after the turn of the century. 
This result is basically in line with Wyplosz (2006) who finds that fiscal policies have become 
more counter-cyclical in the eurozone countries since the formation of the EMU.
15 The reason 
for this change is not immediately clear. One possibility is that the countries seeking to qual-
ify for EMU membership abstained from pursuing counter-cyclical fiscal policies. After hav-
ing secured membership, the policy priorities shifted towards cyclical accommodation.  
 
 
3.4 Expenditure and revenue reactions 
 
We now proceed to estimate separate fiscal policy reaction functions for general government 
expenditure and revenue as a percentage of GDP. The expenditure and revenue are modelled 
as functions of their lagged values, output growth and the lagged debt stock. The results are 
shown in Table 7. 
 
Turning first to the general government expenditure as a percentage of GDP, it follows from 
(7.1) that the expenditure reaction function exhibits only slightly more inertia in the current 
eurozone countries than in future members. Expenditure are counter-cyclical in the sense that 
an  output  increase  does  not  lead  to  a  proportional  increase  in  expenditure;  the  counter-
cyclicality is more pronounced in the CEE countries than in the Eurozone 12 countries, al-
though the difference is not statistically significant. The debt variable enters significantly for 
the CEE countries, but the result stems mainly from Slovakia, which pursued a stop-go fiscal 
policy in parts of the sample period. Removing Slovakia from the sample would make the co-
efficient for DEBT(-1)·W insignificant without affecting the other results qualitatively.  
 
The revenue reaction function is shown in (7.2). Revenue as a percentage of GDP exhibits 
substantial inertia for both the eurozone and the CEE countries. The estimated coefficient for 
GY·W is negative and estimated precisely. This indicates that revenue are pro-cyclical in the 
sense that higher growth is associated with lower revenue as a percentage of GDP. This result 
may be surprising as the bulk of revenue stems from taxes; for the progressive parts of the tax 
system, the tax intake as a percentage of GDP would increase when GDP increases. Mayes & 
Viren (2005), using data from the old EU members, find that government revenue are more 
responsive to decreasing than to increasing growth rates; recessions lead to lower government 
revenue, while booms do not lead to corresponding increases in government revenue. (This 
would be the result if policymakers cut tax rates in booms when tax revenue would otherwise 
increase.) The coefficient for output growth is positive, but insignificant for the CEE coun-
tries. A Wald test confirms that the coefficients for GY·W and GY·E are significantly differ-
ent at the 5% level. 
                                                
15 Gali & Perotti (2003) also find that fiscal policies have become more counter-cyclical in the post-Maastricht 
period.    15 
Table 7. Expenditure and revenue reaction functions 
  (7.1)  (7.2)  (7.3)  (7.4) 
  EXP  REV  REV  REV 
0.500**  ..  ..  ..  EXP(-1)·W 
(0.238)       
0.459***  ..  ..  ..  EXP(-1)·E 
(0.083)       
..  0.742***  0.622***  0.965** 
REV(-1)·W 
  (0.124)  (0.188)  (0.337) 
..  0.652***  -0.197  0.443*** 
REV(-1)·E 
  (0.062)  (0.235)  (0.099) 
-0.290*  -0.222**  -0.299***  -0.185  GY·W 
(0.151)  (0.104)  (0.077)  (0.321) 
-0.422***  0.328  0.230  -0.202 
GY·E 
(0.095)  (0.223)  (0.184)  (0.238) 
-0.0059  -0.0091  -0.040  0.016  DEBT(-1)·W 
(0.042)  (0.027)  (0.047)  (0.106) 
-0.278***  -0.253  -0.647***  -0.040 
DEBT(-1)·E 
(0.094)  (0.129)  (0.112)  (0.146) 
Country dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 






Time sample  95-05  95-05  95-00  01-05 
No. of countries  21  21  18  21 
No. of obs.  183  183  82  101 
Notes: White’s period robust standard errors are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimates. A post-positioned ***, ** or * 
indicates that the null hypothesis of the coefficient being 0 is rejected at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. 
a) The level instruments are EXP(-2), GY(-2) and DEBT(-2). The time-differenced instruments are output growth in the USA, output 
growth in Russia, real oil price growth, and the real Fed funds interest rate. The instruments are included separately for the W and E 
groups. Year dummies are also used as level instruments. 
b) The instruments are as in a) with EXP(-2) replaced by REV(-2). 
These results give some insight into the results for the budget balance found previously and in 
particular into the variations in the responsiveness of the budget balance to output shocks in 
the two country groups. For the CEE countries, a positive growth shock decreases expenditure 
and increases revenue as a percentage of GDP (although the effect on revenue is imprecisely 
estimated). The net effect is a marked improvement of the budget balance. In the case of eu-
rozone countries, a negative output shock decreases expenditure, but also decreases revenue 
as a percentage of GDP. The net effect on the budget balance (in terms of a percentage of 
GDP) is therefore muted as found in, for example, (4.1). In other words, the lack of counter-
cyclicality in the budget balance in the eurozone countries stems from the revenue side, not 
the expenditure side.  
 
Columns (7.3) and (7.4) show the results when the sample period is divided into two sub-
periods. The estimations show that for the eurozone countries the negative effect of output 
growth on revenue as a percentage of GDP is strongest for the early part of the sample, i.e. the 
period before and immediately after the introduction of the euro. This finding corresponds 
with the observed changes in the budget balance reaction function reported in Table 6.  
 
   16 
4. The impact of fiscal policy on output variability 
 
This section considers how different measures of fiscal policy affect output variability in the 
sample countries and also whether there are differences across current and future eurozone 
members. We derive a number of fiscal policy measures and examine their ability to explain 
output variability while controlling for other factors affecting output variability. As usual, the 
challenge is to deal adequately with the endogeneity problem, i.e. to identify respectively the 
effects of economic fluctuations on fiscal policy and the effects of fiscal policy on the cycle.  
 
In this section, Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, Malta and Cyprus are included in the 
analyses. The main reason for this is that the exercises apply cross-section estimations and the 
additional observations improve the efficiency of the estimations. We found in (4.4) in Table 
4 that inclusion of these five non-transition and non-euro countries did not alter the budget 
reaction functions markedly. 
 
We will employ a total of five different country-specific fiscal policy measures. Three of the 
measures are averages of statistical variables and do not require much explanation. EBAL is 
the average general government budget balance over the period 1995-2005. EPrBAL is the 
average primary budget balance over the same period. EREV is the average general govern-
ment revenue intake over the period 1995-2005.  
 
In Section 3, we estimated fiscal policy reaction functions and interpreted the estimated coef-
ficient(s) to the output growth rate as a measure of the cyclicality (or reactivity) of fiscal pol-
icy; cf. also Fatas & Mihov (2001). In particular, Tables 4 and 5 reported estimated reaction 
functions for the budget balance. In this case, a positive coefficient for the output term is 
taken to mean that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical – the larger the coefficient, the more 
counter-cyclical the policy.
 Thus, the estimated coefficients for the output growth term can be 
interpreted as a measure of the degree of fiscal balance counter-cyclicality.
16 It followed from 
Tables 4 and 5 that the budget balance on average was more counter-cyclical for the CEE 
countries than for the eurozone countries.  
 
To derive a country-specific measure of the counter-cyclicality of the fiscal balance, we use 
our panel dataset to estimate a budget balance reaction function along the lines of the regres-
sions in Table 4, but with country-specific coefficients for GY. The coefficient for the lagged 
balance is estimated separately for non-transition and the CEE countries, while the debt term 
is suppressed in order to retain as many degrees of freedom as possible.
17 
 
The estimation is undertaken using the Arellano-Bond GMM methodology with the instru-
ments being the levels of the lagged endogenous variable treated separately for Western and 
Eastern Europe, the two periods lagged and differenced GY for each country and the time 
dummies. Evidently, the large number of coefficients implies that some of the coefficients are 
imprecisely estimated. Still, the coefficients estimated for the lagged budget balance resemble 
those estimated in (4.4). Likewise, the averages of the coefficients for GY for non-transition 
and CEE countries are broadly in line with the values found in (4.4). The two (numerically) 
                                                
16 The coefficient partly captures the effect on the budget balance resulting from automatic stabilisers, i.e. the 
effect  on  the  fiscal  balance  resulting  from  cyclical  changes  while  keeping  policy  (e.g.  tax  rates  and 
unemployment replacement rates) unchanged and the effect of policy changes induced by the cyclical stance. 
17 We have experimented with other ways of estimating the cyclicality term, e.g. estimating equations separately 
for each country and estimating the panel using fixed-effects OLS. Although there are substantial differences in 
the individual country estimates, the different sets of counter-cyclical policy coefficients are strongly correlated.    17 
largest negative coefficients are found for Spain and Greece. The variable CCF (Counter-
Cyclical Fiscal policy) comprises the estimated coefficients for GY for the 27 countries in the 
sample. The average of CCF across the 27 countries is 0.38 and the standard deviation is 0.71. 
The average of CCF is 0.31 for eurozone members and 0.51 for the CEE countries; these av-
erages correspond well to the estimated coefficients for GY·W and GY·E, respectively, in 
(4.4). 
 
Finally, a measure of the non-systematic component of fiscal policy is included. We follow 
Fatas & Mihov (2003a) and define the non-systematic or autonomous part of the fiscal bal-
ance as the part that cannot be predicted given the cyclical movements or easily observable 
control variables.
18 The autonomous fiscal balance can thus be derived as the difference be-
tween the actual budget balance and the balance predicted by a reaction function.
19 In particu-
lar, the variable SDAF comprises the standard deviation of the residuals from (4.4) for each 
country over the period 1995-2005. SDAF is our measure of autonomous fiscal policy. A low 
SDAF indicates that the fiscal balance has been close to the expected fiscal policy reaction 
and, hence, the measure of autonomous policymaking is small. A large SDAF indicates that 
the fiscal balance has been greatly influenced by autonomous policy changes. The average 
SDAF across the 27 countries in the sample is 1.58 and the standard deviation is 0.85. 
 
Table 8 shows the cross-section results when the standard deviation of the private output 
growth is regressed on control variables and variables reflecting the fiscal policy stance. The 
possible endogeneity of several of the explanatory variables and the fact that SDAF and CCF 
have been derived from an initial regression suggest that the estimations should be undertaken 
using instrumental variables. However, the very small sample size and the lack of obvious 
instruments entail that we mainly employ OLS estimation and only use IV estimation for ro-
bustness checks.  
 
A number of control variables are included. First, the overall size of the economy is captured 
by the total purchasing power parity adjusted GDP of each country averaged across the period 
1995-2005. Second, the openness of the economy is proxied by the squared export share aver-
aged over the period 1995-2005. Variables capturing size and openness are also used in e.g. 
Fatas & Mihov (2001, 2003) and Koskela & Viren (2003). Finally, separate dummies for non-
transition EU members and CEE countries are included.  
 
Column (8.1) shows the results when the average budget balance EBAL is included along 
with the control variables. The coefficient for the size variable is negative and significant at 
the 5%-level. The standard deviation of private output growth in an economy the size of the 
UK is, ceteris paribus, 0.7%-point lower than in an economy the size of Holland, i.e. the size 
variable has substantial explanatory power. The coefficient for the openness variable is posi-
tive and significant. Evaluating the derivative in the average of the export shares for the 27 
countries (50.7%), it follows that an increase in the export share from 50% to 60% leads to a 
0.1%-point increase in private output growth volatility. The average budget balance (EBAL) 
                                                
18 Fatas & Mihov (2003a) label the variable “discretionary fiscal policy”, while Gali & Perotti (2003) use the 
term  “non-systematic  discretionary  fiscal  policy”  to  emphasise  that  the  variable  solely  captures  the  non-
systematic component of fiscal policy.  
19 The autonomous fiscal policy component could also have been derived as the difference between the actual 
budget balance and the cyclically adjusted balance as published by e.g. the OECD, IMF or EU. This method is 
not applicable here as historical data on the cyclically adjusted fiscal balance is not available for CEE countries. 
Furthermore, reliable estimates of the cyclically adjusted balance are only available with a very long lag (Buti & 
Sapir 2006, Hallett et al. 2007).   18 
does not enter significantly. From (8.2) it follows that the primary budget balance (EPrBAL) 
also does not appear to affect output volatility in a discernable way. 
Table 8. Determinants of the variability of private output growth  
  (8.1)  (8.2)  (8.3)  (8.4)  (8.5)  (8.6) 
  SDGYP  SDGYP  SDGYP  SDGYP  SDGYP  SDGYP 
0.124  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
EBAL 
(0.126)           
..  0.050  ..  ..  ..  .. 
EPrBAL 
  (0.116)         
..  ..  0.0006  ..  ..  0.135 
SDAF 
    (0.389)      (0.284) 
..  ..  ..  -0.412  ..  0.139 
CCF 
      (0.363)    (0.302) 
..  ..  ..  ..  -0.102**  -0.112** 
EREV 
        (0.038)  (0.042) 
-0.147**  -0.146**  -0.154***  -0.111  -0.167***  -0.182** 
Size  
(0.057)  (0.057)  (0.046)  (0.068)  (0.056)  (0.075) 
1.060**  1.316***  1.297***  1.580***  0.693*  0.618 
Openness 
(0.497)  (0.377)  (0.384)  (0.368)  (0.452)  (0.482) 
2.379***  1.964***  2.098***  2.024**  7.109***  7.450*** 
Constant·W 
(0.383)  (0.487)  (0.676)  (0.334)  (0.504)  (2.069) 
3.544***  3.137***  3.132***  2.238***  7.476***  7.668*** 
Constant·E 
(0.724)  (0.583)  (0.911)  (0.576)  (1.826)  (1.944) 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
No. of countries  27  27  27  27  26  26 
R
2  0.45  0.41  0.41  0.44  0.58  0.59 
Notes: White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimates. A post-positioned ***, 
** or * indicates that the null hypothesis of the coefficient being 0 is rejected at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level. 
Column (8.3) shows the results when the autonomous policy variable is included. The coeffi-
cient for SDAF is very imprecisely estimated and the variable clearly does help explain pri-
vate output volatility. Fatas & Mihov (2003a) find that more fiscal expenditure discretion 
brings about increased output volatility. Using the full set of countries in the current dataset, a 
corresponding result cannot be obtained. Yet, autonomous policy-making, as captured by the 
variable SDAF, does not help reduce volatility, either.  
 
The variable capturing the degree of counter-cyclicality in fiscal policy (CCF) enters with the 
expected negative sign in (8.4), but is insignificant at conventional significance levels. It is 
likely, however, that the coefficient estimate is upwardly biased, as countries with large un-
certainty may choose to pursue more counter-cyclical policies (Rodrik 1998, Fatas & Mihov 
2003a). We have tried to instrument CCF using per capita income, import share and the aver-
age population size (the latter chosen as population size might affect the policy making proc-
ess), but the result was essentially unchanged. The chosen instruments are, however, hardly 
ideal.  
 
Column (8.5) shows that the coefficient for the average revenue intake is negative and signifi-
cant at the 5%-level. This is a recurrent result in the empirical literature; similar findings us-
ing other datasets are reported in e.g. Cohen & Follette (2000), Fatas & Mihov (2001) and 
Koskela & Viren (2003). Column (8.6) shows the results when three fiscal policy variables   19 
are  included  measuring,  respectively,  the  autonomous  policy  aggressiveness,  the  counter-
cyclicality of fiscal policy and the overall size of the government sector. The size of the gov-
ernment sector (the revenue intake) dominates the other two variables.  
 
Table 8 may suggest another interesting result. While the CEE countries during the period 
1995-2005 have on average experienced substantially more output variability than the West-
ern European countries, the group dummies are not significantly different in, e.g. (8.5) and 
(8.6). Thus, the variability of output in the CEE countries can be explained by the size of their 
economies, their trading structure and the size of their governments. The larger variability of 
the CEE countries is thus unlikely to stem from post-transition effects, but is rather a result of 
these countries being small (in economic terms), open and with relatively small public sec-
tors.  
 
Table 9 presents estimations seeking to establish whether fiscal policies affect output variabil-
ity differently in Western European and CEE countries. The size, openness and intercept con-
trol variables are included separately for the two groups of countries. All results should be 
interpreted with caution in light of the limited degrees of freedom.  
Table 9. Region-specific determinants of output growth variability  
  (9.1)  (9.2)  (9.3)  (9.4)  (9.5)  (9.6) 
  SDGYP  SDGYP  SDGYP  SDGYP  SDGY  SDGY 
0.488**  ..  ..  ..  ..  ..  SDAFÂW 
(0.213)           
-0.142  ..  ..  ..  ..  .. 
SDAFÂE 
(0.582)           
..  0.116  ..  0.236  0.018  .. 
CCFÂW 
  (0.219)    (0.234)  (0.176)   
..  -1.931***  ..  -0.201  -1.501***  .. 
CCFÂE 
  (0.547)    (1.468)  (0.374)   
..  ..  -0.027  -0.038  ..  -0.030  EREVÂW 
    (0.024)  (0.023)    (0.024) 
..  ..  -0.310***  -0.299**  ..  -0.163*** 
EREVÂE 
    (0.059)  (0.121)    (0.035) 
-0.117**  -0.143**  -0.139***  -0.169**  -0.068  -0.075  SizeÂW 
(0.046)  (0.052)  (0.042)  (0.060)  (0.060)  (0.053) 
-1.392  -1.722  0.480  0.355  -1.180**  0.276  SizeÂE 
(0.837)  (0.651)  (0.588)  (1.066)  (0.493)  (0.347) 
1.302***  1.452***  1.344***  1.143***  1.578***  1.399*** 
Openness ÂW 
(0.248)  (0.289)  (0.350)  (0.350)  (0.352)  (0.412) 
-2.905  0.314  3.498**  3.575*  0.057  1.317 
OpennessÂE 
(5.797)  (4.637)  (1.810)  (2.040)  (1.785)  (1.107) 
1.209**  1.985***  3.346**  3.892***  1.260***  2.755*  ConstantÂW 
(0.530)  (0.285)  (1.310)  (1.256)  (0.351)  (1.423) 
5.212**  5.120***  15.39***  15.08***  3.791**  8.773** 
ConstantÂE 
(1.877)  (1.877)  (2.719)  (4.390)  (0.850)  (1.057) 
Method  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
No. of countries  27  27  26  26  27  26 
R
2  0.51  0.66  0.80  0.81  0.70  0.78 
Notes: White’s heteroskedastic robust standard errors are shown in brackets below the coefficient estimates. A post-positioned ***, 
** or * indicates that the null hypothesis of the coefficient being 0 is rejected at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level.   20 
Column (9.1) shows that the degree of non-systematic, autonomous fiscal policy increases the 
variability of private output growth in Western EU countries. Although the result may be sur-
prising, it is in accordance with the findings in the work of Mihov (2003a), where the robust-
ness of the finding is thoroughly examined and confirmed to apply also to the high-income 
OECD countries. Autonomous fiscal policy appears to have no influence on growth in the 
CEE countries. 
 
The variable capturing the degree of counter-cyclical fiscal policy (CCF) enters significantly 
and with the expected negative sign for the CEE countries, but appears to be unimportant for 
Western EU countries, cf. (9.2). The result that counter-cyclical fiscal policy reduces growth 
variability in the CEE countries survives instrumentation using the same instruments as be-
fore, albeit only at the 5% level of significance. 
 
As expected, the coefficient for the average revenue intake is negative for both Western Euro-
pean and CEE countries, but it is only statistically significant for the CEE countries, cf. (9.3). 
In (9.4) both CCF and EREV are included; EREV is significant for the CEE countries, but not 
for the group of Western European countries. The fact that the inclusion of CCF and EREV 
simultaneously leads to CCF becoming insignificant is the result of correlation between the 
two variables. The correlation coefficient between the two variables is 0.20 for Western Euro-
pean countries, but 0.47 for the CEE countries. Thus, on average, CEE countries with a large 
revenue intake have pursued more counter-cyclical policies than countries with a smaller gov-
ernment sector. This relationship is less pronounced in the eurozone countries. 
 
The conclusion from (9.1)-(9.4) is that counter-cyclical fiscal policies appear to reduce private 
growth variability in Central and Eastern European countries, but possibly not in the econo-
mies of Western Europe during the period of analysis 1995-2005. Still, the overall size of the 
public sector appears to have greater explanatory power; but this may partly be the result of 
the short time sample leading to imprecise estimates of CCF. Overall, the small size of the 
sample implies that the results should be taken as indicative. Robustness checks with the in-
clusion of dummies for specific countries do not alter the results qualitatively. Using the coef-
ficient estimate from (9.4), it follows that increasing the size of the government by 5%-points 
of GDP will reduce the variability of private sector growth by 1.5%-point in the CEE coun-
tries. This estimate is likely to constitute an upper limit, as the average standard deviation of 
private sector output growth is 2.6% across the entire sample and 3.4% across the CEE coun-
tries.  
 
Columns (9.5) and (9.6) repeat the estimations in (9.2) and (9.3) with the standard deviation 
of total output growth instead of only private sector output growth. The estimated coefficients 
drop somewhat, but the qualitative results remain unchanged.  
 
 
5. Final comments 
 
This paper has compared the formation and effectiveness of fiscal policy in the current and 
future eurozone members. Considering the formation of fiscal policy, empirical analyses indi-
cate that the average fiscal policy reaction of the 10 CEE countries is markedly different from 
the fiscal reaction in the 12 eurozone countries. The results can be outlined in the following 
summary:    21 
i)  The overall budget position is on average worse in the CEE countries than in the euro-
zone countries. Whether the pursuit of a debt-financed fiscal expansion is appropriate or 
not in high-growth economies such as CEE countries is an unresolved issue. 
ii)  The fiscal balance exhibits much less inertia in the CEE countries than in the eurozone 
countries. It has proven easier to adjust the budget balance in the CEE countries than in 
the eurozone countries. This result partly reflects that many of the eurozone countries 
have sustained substantial deficits for long periods of time without the national policy-
makers being able to correct imbalances even when risking reprimands and fines for 
breaching the 3% ceiling of SGP (see also Annett & Jaeger 2004).  
iii)  The fiscal balance is more counter-cyclical in the CEE countries than in the eurozone 
countries; the difference is significant both in statistical and economic terms. This sug-
gests that – given the same degree of output volatility – the CEE countries experience 
more cyclicality in the budget than the eurozone countries.  
iv)  The primary balance strengthens in the eurozone countries when the interest payments 
increase, while a similar result cannot be found for the CEE countries. 
v)  For both the eurozone and CEE countries, the overall budget balance is not affected by 
the public debt stock or interest payments. The finding that there are no direct mecha-
nisms ensuring convergence toward lower levels of government debt suggests that the 
deficit ceiling of SGP is prudent. 
vi)  The main difference in fiscal policy reaction in the eurozone and CEE countries stems 
from  the revenue  intake. The eurozone countries have pursued pro-cyclical revenue 
policies, while the CEE countries have raised revenue in a counter- or a-cyclical reve-
nue fashion.  
vii)  The differences between the eurozone and CEE countries may have been waning over 
time. 
  
Turning now to the effectiveness of fiscal policy, the results are based on cross-section esti-
mations with only 26 or 27 observations. A number of econometric complications imply that 
the results should be interpreted with caution: 
viii)  Autonomous or non-systematic discretionary fiscal policies have had no effect in the 
CEE countries, but may have aggravated economic fluctuations in the eurozone coun-
tries. Autonomous policies have not contributed to a stabilisation of the real economy.  
ix)  Counter-cyclical fiscal policies may have decreased private growth variability in the 
CEE countries, but government size is a more important factor explaining growth vari-
ability in these countries.  
 
In conclusion, in spite of the Central and Eastern European countries having run substantial 
deficits  since  the  mid-1990s,  their  overall  fiscal  policy  appears  to  be  more  “agile”  and 
counter-cyclical than that of Western Europe. Furthermore, counter-cyclical fiscal policies 
have likely reduced growth fluctuations. The Central and Eastern European economies are 
small, open and exposed to a multitude of shocks, but have still managed to attain a reason-
able degree of macroeconomic stability.  
 
The conclusions above are all framed by the short sample on which the analyses are based. 
The lack of data points dictated that the analyses were kept simple and parsimonious. Only 11 
or fewer annual data points for each country meant that the empirical analysis could not be 
undertaken on an individual country level, but had to rely on panel data estimations. The joint   22 
determination of economic output fluctuations and fiscal stance necessitated the use of in-
strumentation. As usual, the results obtained will be no better than the quality of the instru-
ments used.  
 
Turning finally to the future accession of the Central and Eastern European countries to the 
EMU, there are several policy implications in this paper. First, the agile fiscal policy reactions 
suggest that although several of the CEE countries have or have had substantial deficits, they 
should not face very large problems moving their budgets towards a more sustainable posi-
tion, allowing them to satisfy the Maastricht criteria on government deficits. Second, the high 
degree of counter-cyclicality in budget balance implies that it will be much easier for the CEE 
countries to satisfy the deficit criterion during booms than recessions. 
 
Third, the relative effectiveness of counter-cyclical fiscal policy and, more broadly, govern-
ment intervention in the CEE countries, may suggest that the lack of monetary autonomy after 
accession to the EMU will not bring about an unduly large increase in output volatility. Fiscal 
policies can help dampen cyclical movements from asymmetric shocks. Fourth, an active 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy may lead to substantial fluctuations in the budget balance across 
the economic cycle, which increases the risk of breaking the Stability and Growth Pact. De-
velopments in years to come will tell whether these anticipations and concerns prove justified.    23 
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Appendix A 
 
The source of all variables is Eurostat (2006). The data was downloaded on 1 August 2006.  
 
 
Variables varying over time and across countries 
BAL   =   General government budget balance, percent of GDP. 
DEBT  =  General government debt, percent of GDP. 
E   =   Dummy equal to 0 for the eurozone countries, the EU15 countries or the 
EU15 plus Malta and Cyprus (depending on context); 1 for the countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
EXP  =  General government expenditure, percent of GDP. 
GY  =  Growth of GDP, percent year-to-year. 
GYP  =   Growth of private sector GDP, percent year-to-year. 
INTR  =  General government interest payments, percent of GDP. 
PrBAL  =  General government primary budget balance, calculated as PrBAL = BAL 
+ INTR. 
REV  =   General government (tax and non-tax) revenue, percent of GDP. 
W  =  Dummy equal to 1 for the eurozone countries, the EU15 countries or the 
EU15 plus Malta and Cyprus (depending on context); 0 for the countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
Variables varying over time (used as “outside instruments” in GMM-AB estimations) 
Output growth in Russia  =   Growth  of  GDP,  percent  year-to-year.  Source:  Transition 
Report  2005:  Business  in  Transition,  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development. Macroeconomic indica-
tors, http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/6520.htm. 
Output growth in the USA   =   Growth of GDP, percent year-to-year. 
Real Fed funds interest rate  =  Average  annual  Federal  Funds  rate  minus  US  consumer 
price  inflation.  Sources:  http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
releases/h15/data.htm;  IMF,  International  Financial 
Statistics (CD-rom). 
Real oil price growth  =   Growth  of  oil  price  (average  of  three  widely  traded  oil 
types) in US dollars deflated by US consumer price index. 




   27 
Variables varying across countries 
CCF  =  Degree of Counter-Cyclicality of Fiscal balance. The country-specific CCF 
coefficients are obtained from a panel estimation explaining BAL by its 
lagged value and GY; the country-specific coefficient to GY is CCF. 
CEE dummy  =  Dummy equal to 0 for the EU15 plus Malta and Cyprus; 1 for countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
EBAL  =  Average of BAL across 1995-2005. 
EPrBAL   =  Average of PrBAL across 1995-2005. 
EREV  =  Average of REV across 1995-2005. 
Openness  =   Squared value of average of export as a share of GDP across 1995-2005.  
SDAF   =   Measure of autonomous policy “aggressiveness”; standard deviation of re-
sidual from (4.4) across 1995-2005. 
Size  =  Product of the following two variables, i.e. the index of relative Purchasing 
Power Parity adjusted GDP per capita (EU25 = 100) averaged across the 
years 1995-2005 and the average population across 1995-2005 in billions. 
   28 
Appendix B 
Table B.1. The general government budget balance in 27 European countries, % of GDP 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005
a)  Avg.
b) 
Belgium  -4.3  -3.8  -2.0  -0.7  -0.4  0.2  0.6  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.1  -0.9 
Bulgaria  ..  ..  -0.3  1.7  0.4  -0.5  1.4  -0.2  0.6  1.3  ..  0.6 
Czech Republic  ..  ..  -2.5  -5.0  -3.6  -3.7  -5.9  -6.8  -6.6  -2.9  -2.6  -4.4 
Denmark  -3.1  -1.9  -0.5  0.2  2.4  1.7  2.6  1.2  1.0  2.7  4.9  1.0 
Germany  -3.3  -3.4  -2.7  -2.2  -1.5  1.3  -2.9  -3.7  -4.0  -3.7  -3.3  -2.7 
Estonia  ..  ..  1.9  -0.3  -3.7  -0.6  0.3  1.0  2.4  1.5  1.6  0.5 
Greece  -10.2  -7.4  -4.0  -2.5  -1.8  -4.1  -6.1  -4.9  -5.8  -6.9  -4.5  -5.3 
Spain  ..  -4.9  -3.2  -3.0  -1.2  -0.9  -0.5  -0.3  0.0  -0.1  1.1  -1.3 
France  -5.5  -4.1  -3.0  -2.7  -1.8  -1.4  -1.6  -3.2  -4.2  -3.7  -2.9  -3.1 
Ireland  -2.1  -0.1  1.1  2.4  2.4  4.4  0.8  -0.4  0.2  1.5  1.0  1.0 
Italy  -7.6  -7.1  -2.7  -2.8  -1.7  -0.6  -3.2  -2.9  -3.4  -3.4  -4.1  -3.6 
Cyprus  ..  ..  ..  -4.3  -4.5  -2.4  -2.3  -4.5  -6.3  -4.1  -2.4  -3.9 
Latvia  ..  ..  ..  -0.6  -4.9  -2.8  -2.1  -2.3  -1.2  -0.9  0.2  -1.8 
Lithuania  ..  ..  -1.1  -3.0  -5.6  -2.5  -2.0  -1.4  -1.2  -1.5  -0.5  -2.1 
Luxembourg  2.1  1.9  3.2  3.2  3.7  6.0  6.1  2.0  0.2  -1.1  -1.9  2.3 
Hungary  ..  ..  -6.8  -8.0  -5.6  -3.0  -3.5  -8.4  -6.4  -5.4  -6.1  -5.9 
Malta  ..  ..  -10.7  -10.8  -7.6  -6.2  -6.6  -5.6  -10.2  -5.1  -3.3  -7.3 
Netherlands  -4.2  -1.8  -1.1  -0.8  0.7  2.2  -0.2  -2.0  -3.1  -1.9  -0.3  -1.1 
Austria  -5.6  -3.9  -1.8  -2.3  -2.2  -1.5  0.1  -0.5  -1.5  -1.1  -1.5  -2.0 
Poland  ..  ..  -4.0  -2.1  -1.4  -0.7  -3.7  -3.2  -4.7  -3.9  -2.5  -2.9 
Portugal  -4.5  -4.0  -3.0  -2.6  -2.8  -2.8  -4.2  -2.9  -2.9  -3.2  -6.0  -3.5 
Romania  ..  ..  -4.5  -4.4  -2.1  -3.8  -3.5  -2.0  -2.0  -1.4  ..  -3.0 
Slovenia  ..  ..  ..  -2.2  -2.1  -3.5  -3.9  -2.7  -2.8  -2.3  -1.8  -2.7 
Slovakia  ..  ..  -5.5  -4.7  -6.4  -12.3  -6.6  -7.7  -3.7  -3.0  -2.9  -5.9 
Finland  -3.7  -3.2  -1.5  1.5  2.2  7.1  5.2  4.1  2.5  2.3  2.6  1.7 
Sweden  -7.0  -2.7  -0.9  1.8  2.5  5.1  2.5  -0.2  0.1  1.8  2.9  0.5 
United Kingdom  -5.7  -4.3  -2.0  0.2  1.0  3.8  0.7  -1.6  -3.3  -3.3  -3.6  -1.6 
EU15
c  ..  ..  ..  -1.6  -0.7  1.0  -1.2  -2.2  -2.9  -2.6  -2.3  -1.6 
EU25
c  ..  ..  ..  -1.7  -0.8  0.8  -1.3  -2.3  -3.0  -2.6  -2.3  -1.7 
a) Estimates by Eurostat.  
b) Average over 1995-2005 (or available sample). 
c GDP weighted averages (Bulgaria and Romania are not included in EU25). 
Source: Eurostat (2006).  CESifo Working Paper Series 
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